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HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW 62 (1969), 301-348. 
THE LAST DAYS OF ERASTIANISM - FORMS IN 
THE AMERICAN CHURCH-STATE NEXUS 
ROBERT E. RODES, JR. 
NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL 
NOTRE DAME, INDIANA 46556 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
IN 1843, the Reverend Robert Baird, "an esteemed minister of 
the American Presbyterian Church," sojourning seven years in 
Europe "for the prosecution of certain religious and philanthropic 
objects," published a book for the benefit of the various Europeans 
who had addressed to him "innumerable inquiries . . . respecting 
his native country, and especially respecting its religious institu- 
tions." 1 
The work begins with suitable historical and geographical data, 
followed by a demonstration that the government of the United 
States, and of the several states, though formally nonreligious, is 
in fact actuated by Christian principles, and sympathetic to the 
work of the churches. From there, the author goes on to develop 
what he calls the "Voluntary Principle" that is "the American 
plan of supporting religion by relying, under God's blessing, upon 
the efforts of the people, rather than upon the help of the govern- 
ment." 2 He shows the rich variety of ecclesiastical and philan- 
thropic institutions that have grown up under the impetus of this 
principle, including not only edifices for religious worship and 
missions for spreading the Gospel but also schools and colleges, 
institutes for the temporal and spiritual succor of seamen, 
prisoners, the poor, and the insane; schools for the training of the 
deaf, the dumb, and the blind; and societies for the abolition of 
liquor, Sabbath-breaking, slavery, and war. Some of these in- 
stitutions rely entirely on the piety and philanthropy of those who 
wish to support them; others have a sufficient temporal dimension 
1 ROBERT BAIRD, Religion in the United States of America (Glasgow, Blackie & 
Son, 1844), v, vi. 
2 Id., 69. 
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to gain some state support, after being founded out of zeal for 
Christian service. 
What I find particularly striking about this paean is its resem- 
blance to a modern release by the National Association of Manu- 
facturers extolling the economic benefits of the Free Enterprise 
System. Indeed, the Voluntary Principle as Baird conceives it is 
precisely the American system of Free Enterprise applied to the 
ecclesiastical sphere. Small wonder it has the same kind of 
triumphs to report. The triumphs are conceived in utilitarian 
terms. Things eminently useful to the community are being ac- 
complished at no cost to the taxpayer, through giving scope to the 
zeal and ingenuity of the free citizen. It is in these terms that the 
Rev. Mr. Baird conceives the institutional church and its place in 
American life. 
Half a century later, a still more exuberant statement of similar 
effect was written, in the introductory volume of the important 
American Church History Series, by H. K. Carroll, who was in 
charge of amassing religious data for the 189o census. After deal- 
ing with the ecclesiastical state of the country in a variety of statis- 
tical and organizational terms, Carroll provides a summary of 
"How the Church Affects Society" which is worth considering in 
full: 
It is to be remembered that all the houses of worship have been built 
by voluntary contributions. They have been provided by private 
gifts, but are offered to the public for free use. The government has 
not given a dollar to provide them, nor does it appropriate a dollar for 
their support. And yet the church is the mightiest, most pervasive, 
most persistent, and most beneficent force in our civilization. It 
affects, directly or indirectly, all human activities and interests. 
It is a large property-holder, and influences the market for real 
estate. 
It is a corporation, and administers large trusts. 
It is a public institution, and is therefore the subject of protective 
legislation. 
It is a capitalist, and gathers and distributes large wealth. 
It is an employer, and furnishes means of support to ministers, 
organists, singers, janitors, and others. 
It is a relief organization feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, 
and assisting the destitute. 
It is a university, training children and instructing old and young, 
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by public lectures on religion, morals, industry, thrift, and the duties 
of citizenship. 
It is a reformatory influence, recovering the vicious, immoral, and 
dangerous elements of society and making them exemplary citizens. 
It is a philanthropic association, sending missionaries to the re- 
motest countries to Christianize savage and degraded races. 
It is organized beneficence, founding hospitals for the sick, asylums 
for orphans, refuges for the homeless, and schools, colleges, and uni- 
versities for the ignorant. 
It prepares the way for commerce and creates and stimulates in- 
dustries. Architects, carpenters, painters, and other artisans are 
called to build its houses of worship; mines, quarries, and forests are 
worked to provide the materials, and railroads and ships are employed 
in transporting them. It requires tapestries and furnishings, and the 
looms that weave them are busy day and night. It buys millions of 
Bibles, prayer-books, hymn-books, and papers, and the presses which 
supply them never stop. 
Who that considers these moral and material aspects of the church 
can deny that it is beneficent in its aims, unselfish in its plans, and 
impartial in the distribution of its blessings? It is devoted to the 
temporal and eternal interests of mankind. 
Every cornerstone it lays, it lays for humanity; every temple it 
opens, it opens to the world; every altar it establishes, it establishes 
for the salvation of souls. Its spires are fingers pointing heavenward; 
its ministers are messengers of good tidings, ambassadors of hope, 
and angels-of mercy. 
What is there among men to compare with the church in its power 
to educate, elevate, and civilize mankind? 3 
This utilitarian tendency of the nineteenth-century American 
churchman was not new; it was his heritage. As early as 1306, the 
commons of England expressed a similar view of why men set up 
churches: 
S 
. 
. 
to inform them and the people of the law of God, and to make 
hospitalities, alms, and other works of charity in the places where the 
churches were founded.4 
Baird and Carroll, it seems clear, would have agreed. 
3 H. K. CARROLL, The Religious Forces of the United States (New York, Christian 
Literature Co., 1893), lx-lxi. 
'Rotuli Parliamentorum (1767) I, 319a, quoted in the preamble to 25 Edw. III 
c. 6 (1350). 
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I have tried in other places to show the historical continuity 
between the viewpoint of the fourteenth-century commons as ex- 
pressed in this passage and the Erastianism that occupied a cen- 
tral position in the Anglican Church from the seventeenth through 
the nineteenth centuries. I have also tried to show the affinities 
between English Erastianism and comparable movements on this 
side of the Atlantic." What all the manifestations of this Erastian 
tradition have in common, and what I have taken for my purposes 
as a definition of Erastianism, is a view of the institutional church 
as one of a variety of institutions through which a Christian society 
conforms itself to the will of God. In practice, this view has often 
resulted in a domination of the church by the state, but I think 
that is merely a byproduct of placing the church on a par with the 
other institutions of society. Certainly, Erastianism is not to be 
equated with the totalitarian view that religious institutions are to 
be subordinated to secular ends. Quite the opposite, it insists that 
religious ends are to be pursued 'purposefully and efficiently, just 
as secular ends are. 
It is in this venerable Erastian tradition that Baird and Carroll 
write, and it is an audience in the same tradition they have in mind. 
If anyone doubts it, let him consider what Baird and a contem- 
porary non-Erastian such as Keble would have had to say to each 
other, or how Baird would have answered the English pamphleteer 
who attributed our Civil War to a divine punishment for our 
failure to have an established church. 
So we can think of the dominant theme in American church- 
state thinking as a kind of free-enterprise Erastianism. Adhering 
to the basic Erastian insight that views the institutional church as 
one of the many institutional forms through which a Christian 
society conforms itself to the will of God, it adds the American 
free enterprise insight that sees institutional forms as most efficient 
when freed from the inhibiting presence of government support. 
It appeals to Erastian criteria of efficiency to commend the whole 
system versus other systems in which government plays a more 
active role. 
SSee my The Passing of Nonsectarianism, Notre Dame Lawyer 38 (1963), 115, 
121-28. 
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This Erastian conception of the American church-state nexus 
is by no means confined to the nineteenth century. It is nowhere 
more apparent than in the monumental Church and State in the 
United States, published by the late Canon Stokes in 1950.6 The 
main themes around which Stokes develops the historical and 
social panorama of his subject are "adjustments" and "national 
issues." Adjustments are the ways in which the several institu- 
tional churches, minus the benefits and burdens of state support, 
have fallen into their role of embodying the ecclesiastical dimen- 
sion of the overall national life. National issues are those matters 
in which the churches have played institutional roles in dealing 
with the concerns of the community as a whole. The general spirit 
of the work is one of thoughtful analysis of the experience of a 
nation under God, and of the place of the institutional church in 
that experience. 
In the long history of Christendom, the Erastian view of which 
these American works are the modern representatives has existed 
in tension with what I have called a High Church view. This view, 
represented by the Gregorian reformers in the twelfth century, the 
Laudians in the seventeenth, the Oxford movement in the nine- 
teenth, and a variety of less prominent movements in between, 
has emphasized a Christian witness to the otherness of God. 
Hence, it has seen the institutional church as standing over against 
society in general, rather than as constituting one of the institu- 
tions through which society in general conforms itself to the will 
of God. The High Church attitude tends to point up the short- 
comings of society, and to offer the Christian a way of dissociating 
himself from them, rather than of ameliorating them. In the past, 
High Churchmanship has sought an institutional witness in forms 
that express the independence of the church, and her freedom 
from the corruptions besetting the rest of society. 
On the whole, though, our own country has not developed forms 
of this kind. Our prevailing church-state doctrine shows traces 
of High Church thinking, as we shall see.' But the generally 
6 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, Church and State in the United States, 3 vols. (New 
York, Harper, 1950) ; hereafter, STOKES. 
' See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, The Garden and the Wilderness (Chicago, Uni- 
versity of Chicago Press, 1965), 1-31 and passim, in which he contrasts with 
Jefferson's doctrine of church-state separation (which he considers anticlerical if 
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optimistic tone of American society has kept such thinking from 
gaining a solid place in the institutional witness of any of the 
main-stream churches. It is well known that Roman Catholics in 
this country have tended to play down the transcendent institu- 
tional claims of their church and play up her place among the 
useful institutions of democratic society - so much so that the 
Roman authorities occasionally took alarm.8 It is also clear that 
High Anglicanism in this country, lacking the historical position 
of its English counterpart, did not duplicate the institutional 
aspirations of the earlier Tractarians." On the whole, a general 
denunciation of the world's ways in America has been left to fringe 
churches, which form enclaves and mind their own business, 
rather than bearing witness against the overall society. 
The American legal structure has also played a part in inhibiting 
the growth of High Church forms. The utilitarian values charac- 
teristic of Erastianism can be implemented by a multiplicity of 
churches as readily as by one, by private action as readily as by 
the state. This is the cogent truth which American experience has 
shown with such finality to the other nations of the world. But the 
transcendent witness of High Churchmanship is hard to institu- 
tionalize in churches none of which can claim a dominant position 
in the overall society, or, indeed, any position at all beyond what 
it derives from its constituents. The Voluntary Principle is not a 
felicitous expression of the otherness of God. 
In a period of increasing self-doubt at many levels of American 
not antireligious) Roger Williams' doctrine on the same subject, as set forth in the 
following passage, id., at 5-6: S 
. 
. 
The faithful labors of many witnesses of Jesus Christ, extant to the world, 
abundantly proving that the church of the Jews under the Old Testament in the 
type, and the church of the Christians under the New Testament in the antitype, 
were both separate from the world; and that when they have opened a gap in 
the hedge or wall of separation between the garden of the church and the wilder- 
ness of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the candle- 
stick, and made His garden a wilderness, as at this day. And that therefore if He 
will ever please to restore His garden and paradise again, it must of necessity be 
walled in peculiarly unto Himself from the world; and that all that shall be 
saved out of the world are to be transplanted out of the wilderness of the world, 
and added unto his church or garden. 
s STOKES, II, 356-69. 
" JAMES T. ADDISON, The Episcopal Church in the United States, 1789-1931 
(New York, Scribner's, 1951), devotes a whole chapter to "The Oxford Movement 
and its American Results" without finding it necessary to say anything at all about 
the church-state aspects of the English movement. 
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society, a number of the traditional Erastian forms are beginning 
to look a bit shopworn, and Christianity itself is beginning to suffer 
through the identification of those forms with an overly optimistic 
view of the status quo. It would seem that at such a time as this 
the lack of a well-formulated High Church alternative will be 
increasingly felt. With this state of affairs in mind, I propose in 
this article to explore the current state of our basically Erastian 
church-state nexus and to consider what forces, if any, may bring 
a relevant and effective institutional High Church witness into 
being. 
I will begin with a fairly extensive analysis of the legal forms in 
which we articulate our understanding of the nature of the institu- 
tional church and its place in our national life. Our understanding 
of the church itself is developed in a line of cases involving the 
judicial resolution of intra-church disputes and the effect to be 
given the mandates of ecclesiastical authority. Our understand- 
ing of the place of the church in our national life is shown in our 
legislative and judicial treatment of tax exemption and state sup- 
port for church-connected activities. 
Following this legal analysis, I will take up more briefly the 
Erastian forms through which the church implements the generally 
accepted understanding of its role in the national life, and the 
incipient High Church forms which may be in the process of 
claiming for the church a new and more radical role. In con- 
clusion, I will offer a possible projection into the future. 
II 
LEGAL FORMS 
A. Intra-church Disputes 
The status of the institutional church before the secular law 
presents a double aspect. On the one hand, the establishment and 
organizing of churches is regarded as a legitimate activity of the 
citizens, in which they are entitled to suitable protection from their 
government. On the other hand, the mediation of the church 
between God and man is regarded as a mystery in which the tri- 
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bunals of the state, whether from constitutional limitations or 
from the nature of things, are incompetent to intervene. The two 
approaches are combined in varying ways in the decisions of the 
courts. 
The first approach may be regarded as the Erastian-Voluntary 
approach. It sees the religious dimension of life as a part of the 
pursuit of happiness, and therefore as one of the functional com- 
mitments of secular government. It treats the church as one 
among the variety of institutions through which happiness is pur- 
sued. The second approach has affinities for the High Church 
position. It sees the religious dimension of life as imposing a fun- 
damental limitation on the scope of secular government. It is 
capable, therefore, of looking at the church as occupying an area 
closed to secular government and to all those institutions secular 
government controls. 
These two principles operate with general harmony in support- 
ing the autonomy of American churches, but at certain points they 
clash. The problem when a question of ecclesiastical polity comes 
before the courts is whether to deal with it in terms of some prin- 
ciple of secular law - trust, contract, or corporation law - or in 
terms of the existential organic forms of the church in question. 
If we see the church as merely another of those arrangements de- 
veloped by citizens in pursuit of their lawful occasions, we will 
naturally apply the principles of law by which other such arrange- 
ments are dealt with. For the purpose, we have ready to hand the 
substantial body of law developed in England for dealing with 
the affairs of dissenters from the Established Church o0 (whose 
organizations are secular because only the Established Church is 
ecclesiastical)." On the other hand, if we see the several churches, 
for all their diversity, as embodying in some way the institutional 
transcendence of Christianity, we are more apt to let their internal 
processes work in their own way. For this purpose, if we are un- 
willing to rest in the higher reaches of theology, we can find an 
10Ecclesiastical Law in HALSBURY, The Laws of England, 3d edition, Simonds 
ed., XIII (i955), I, 527-34. 
" See the extensive discussion of this point in Selden v. Overseers of the Poor 
(Va. Ch. 1830), Cases on Church and State in the United States, Howe ed. (Cam- 
bridge, Harvard, 1952), i6, affirmed ii Leigh 127 (Va. 1830). 
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effective doctrinal base in the corporate mystique of Gierke and 
his followers.12 
Let us see how these alternative approaches work out in prac- 
tice. In 1840, suppose, the Brimstone Evangelical Church was 
founded, with a Central Synod and a number of local congrega- 
tions. The founders adopted a Confession of Faith and an Order 
of Church Polity. The former document spelled out the doctrinal 
tenets of the church; the latter, the organization of the local con- 
gregations and their relation to the Central Synod. The local 
congregation in Jordan City was founded in 1853, and operated in 
accordance with the Order of Church Polity. The congregation 
sent delegates to the Central Synod, hired ministers ordained by 
the Synod, and otherwise conducted itself in accordance with the 
regulations of the Synod. Worship was conducted on land deeded 
by a church member in 1856 "in trust for the Brimstone Evangeli- 
cal Church in Jordan City." 
A couple of years ago, the Central Synod adopted a new Con- 
fession of Faith, which mitigated considerably the uncompromis- 
ing position on predestination taken by the earlier document. 
The new Confession was bitterly fought in the Synod, and more 
bitterly still in the local congregations, but the more tradition- 
minded were in most cases outvoted. In the Jordan City congre- 
gation, a motion to reject the new confession and sever connections 
with the Synod was voted down 86-34. 
At this point, the minority of the congregation appeals to 
Caesar. They are aware, of course, that the majority may adopt 
what doctrine they please; what they are interested in is getting 
the building and the bank account for their party. They claim they 
are entitled to these because they represent the doctrines for 
which the property was given. It is on this - a litigation more or 
less over the possession of property - that the secular courts must 
rule. 
They have two stock legal categories to work with. The founda- 
tion documents of the church are a kind of contract, and the 
original deed of the land is a kind of trust. So we can look at the 
documents and see if they give the Synod power to change the 
12 This approach to ecclesiastical disputes is developed in J. N. FIGGIS, Churches 
in the Modern State (New York, 1914). 
This content downloaded from 129.74.250.206 on Fri, 1 Nov 2013 08:49:40 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
310 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW 
Confession, or we can look at the intentions of the grantor and see 
if a change in the Confession was envisaged when he deeded the 
land. Either of these approaches will probably come up with a 
negative answer and results in giving the property to those who 
oppose the new Confession. 
Complicate the matter a little more. Suppose that in I894 the 
Jordan City congregation took out articles of incorporation under 
one of the numerous state statutes for the incorporation of 
churches, providing itself with a Board of Trustees, and whatever 
other apparatus the statute requires. Then the courts, in addition 
to the appropriate questions of trust or contract, can worry about 
whether the vote was taken in accordance with statutory forms 
whether the meeting was properly called, the voting rolls properly 
kept, and what have you. 
On the other hand, if we look at the church as a living organ- 
ization, we will be reluctant to use juridical concepts so foreign to 
its nature to frustrate its response, to the promptings of the Spirit 
or the currents of the times. We may well conclude that when its 
institutional processes have moved as far as they are capable of 
moving, it is not the place of the secular authorities to stand in the 
way.13 To be sure, a man could set up a trust or enter into a con- 
tract to propagate a particular doctrine of predestination, but on 
this view of the situation we will not go out of our way to suppose 
that he has in fact done so. 
Of the two approaches described here, the more forward-looking 
theologians have naturally favored the second, pointing out that 
the first, or trust-and-contract, approach tends to inhibit religious 
development, especially in the area of ecumenism.'" It tends to 
produce a separate institutional form to correspond to every 
nuance of doctrine. The courts, on the other hand, when forced to 
concern themselves with ecclesiastical matters, have found comfort 
in clinging to the familiar categories of secular law. 
A variety of compromises have been attempted. Some courts, 
for instance, especially those of New York, endeavor to draw a 
"3 See the exuberant statement of this principle in McGinnis v. Watson, 41 Pa. 
St. 9 (i86i). 
" STRINGFELLOW, Law, Polity and the Reunion of the Church, Ohio State Law 
Journal 20 (1959), 412; CASAD, The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical 
Movement, Michigan Law Review 62 (1964), 419. 
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distinction between a "spiritual" entity, the "church," and a 
"temporal" entity, the "society," which exist in a kind of hypostatic 
union, the one governed by denominational custom, the other by 
state law.'" This distinction is more persuasive when applied to 
those Protestant bodies which restrict their communion to persons 
who have undergone a special experience of conversion, or who 
otherwise possess qualities the whole congregation does not have.16 
It seems ultimately to relate to ecclesiological conceptions that 
radically distinguish the Mystical Body from the visible church. 
Those who reject the ecclesiology in question 17 may find the 
judicial doctrine less than congenial. And even those who accept 
the ecclesiology may object to the scope the judicial doctrine gives 
for interfering in the temporal affairs of a church on behalf of 
members of the congregation who are not full-fledged communi- 
cants. 
The United States Supreme Court, almost a century ago, in the 
famous Watson v. Jones decision,1" attempted to give some recog- 
nition to the existential organization of the church without going 
too far afield from familiar legal categories. Cases involving ec- 
clesiastical property, the Court said, fell into three categories: 
i. Where the property is subject to an express trust, that trust 
will be enforced as written. 
2. Where the property is held by an independent congregation, 
the court will apply the usual principles of law governing 
voluntary associations to determine which of the contending 
parties constitutes the congregation in question. 
3. Where the property is held by a congregation belonging to 
a "hierarchical" church with superior judicial or adminis- 
trative bodies, the determination of those bodies will be 
given effect. 
" Hayes v. Trustees of Holy Trinity Baptist Church, 225 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Sup. 
1962). 
"0 Robertson v. Bullions, ii N.Y. 243 (1854), a leading case on the distinction 
between church and corporation, attaches considerable weight to the exclusiveness 
of full communion. 
'7 It is expressly rejected, for instance, in the encyclical Mystici Corporis of Pius 
XII. 
18 13 Wall. 679 (U.S. 1871). 
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As the case involved a church in the third category, remarks about 
the treatment of the other two categories may be regarded as dic- 
tum. Even as to the third category, the Court's decision was only 
federal common-law - the state courts were not obliged to fol- 
low it."9 But as a fairly sophisticated approach to the diversity of 
church forms in our society, it generally commended itself. In any 
event, the Kedroff decision in 1952 2" erected it into a constitu- 
tional doctrine. 
Between Kedroff and the Supreme Court's latest pronounce- 
ment on the subject in the Hull Memorial case (January, 1969),21 
the state courts developed a couple of modifications of the Su- 
preme Court doctrine. The most important of these was the Fun- 
damental Change Rule, whereby dissenters were protected against 
any change in doctrine which the courts were willing to character- 
ize as "fundamental" even though the appropriate ecclesiastical 
machinery had adopted it. The theory was that the property was 
subject to an "implied trust" that it would not be fundamentally 
diverted from the religious affiliation the donors had in mind.22 
This rule was applied more to congregational than to hierarchical 
churches, presumably because of the greater stability and ex- 
pertise to be expected from the higher authorities of a hierarchi- 
cal church."2 But even these higher authorities were occasionally 
overruled on fundamental changes.2" 
The other modification was more subtle. Watson v. Jones 
expressly disclaimed any right of the secular courts in dealing with 
the affairs of a hierarchical church to determine whether the higher 
"1Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo. 353 (1873), a product of the same Presbyterian 
schism over slavery that evoked Watson v. Jones, takes the latter case vigorously 
to task as an abrogation of the proper responsibility of civil courts: 
The civil courts are presumed to know the law touching property rights; and if 
questions of ecclesiastical law, connected with property rights, come before them, 
they are compelled to decide them. They have no power to abdicate their own 
jurisdiction and transfer it to other tribunals. If they are not sufficiently ad- 
vised concerning the questions that arise, it is their duty to make themselves 
better acquainted with them, in all their bearings, and not to blindly register the 
decrees of tribunals having no jurisdiction whatever over property. 
? Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
21 Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 89 Sup. Ct. 6oi (U.S. 1969). 
22 See, e.g., Stansberry v. McCarty, 238 Ind. 338, 149 N.E.2d 683 (1958); Holi- 
man v. Dovers, 236 Ark. 211, 366 S.W.2d 197, 15 A.L.R.3d 277 (1963). 
' See CASAD, supra, note 14 at 445f. 
.2 See, e.g., 
Mills v. Yount, 393 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. App. 1965). 
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authorities acted within the jurisdiction allowed them under the 
laws and customs of the church. The theory was that a church 
tribunal, learned in the laws under which it sits, is better equipped 
to determine its jurisdiction than a secular court would be. 
The state courts - perhaps because they had a wider variety 
of churches to worry about - tended to be a little more sophisti- 
cated on this point. A number of them recognized that a church 
might straddle two of the categories in Watson v. Jones - be 
congregational in some respects, hierarchical in others - or that 
the founders of a church organization might have seen fit to 
impose constitutional restraints on ecclesiastical authority as 
such.25 
So, if our hypothetical case had been decided last year, the 
court would have been very apt to consider whether the modifica- 
tion of the confession of Faith on predestination was fundamental, 
and, if not, whether the Central Synod acted within its authority 
in making it. This year it is a different story. In Presbyterian 
Church in the United States v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
Church,26 the Supreme Court held that the Fundamental Change 
Rule (which they characterized as the "departure-from-doctrine 
approach") "can play no role in any future judicial proceedings" 27 
(Mr. Justice Brennan's italics). 
If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in order to 
adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of in- 
' See, e.g., Western Conference v. Creech, 256 N.C. 128, 123 S.E.2d 619 (1962); 
CASAD, supra, note 14 at 44on. Among the complications not envisaged in the 
Watson v. Jones categories is that presented by a case with which I have some 
acquaintance in which the issue was which of three hierarchies was the one to which 
a certain local congregation had adhered. Another complication was suggested by 
an unsuccessful petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in the 
famous Mellish case. See LEO PFEFFER, Church, State and Freedom (Boston, Bea- 
con, 1953), 251-57 (hereafter, PFEFFER). The case involved a state court intervening 
in a dispute in an Episcopal parish by (quite properly under Watson v. Jones 
standards) granting an injunction in favor of the faction approved by the bishop. 
The point raised on the petition for certiorari was that the canon law of the 
Episcopal Church had a specific sanction for a parish violating the bishop's order 
--deprivation of representation in the diocesan convention. Accordingly, the ap- 
plication of Watson v. Jones gave the bishop more power than the canons of the 
church gave him--more power, it might be added, than any Anglican bishop has 
had in all history before. 
2889 Sup. Ct. 6o0 (U.S. 1969). S 
Id. at 607. 
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hibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating 
secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern.2s 
Hull Memorial does not put quite the same italicized quietus on 
the concern of the state courts with whether ecclesiastical tribu- 
nals act within their jurisdictional limits. It cited with apparent ap- 
proval an old case in which the court rejected the determination of 
the majority of the general conference of the United Brethren 
Church as to whether a purported constitutional amendment had 
been properly voted in by the membership.29 So, though the 
Supreme Court is very stern in admonishing that 
States, religious organizations and individuals must structure re- 
lationships involving church property so as not to require the civil 
courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions . . .30 
we cannot be sure quite how they would deal with a case like 
Western Conference v. Creech,3' in which the issue was whether 
a local congregation of Original Free Will Baptists had power 
under the polity of that church to withdraw from the Conference 
to which it belonged. 
Be that as it may, it seems pretty clear at this point that these 
cases must be looked at in constitutional terms - that is, as funda- 
mentally involving religious freedom rather than tenure of 
property. In applying the concept of religious freedom, there is 
still a double aspect. To say that a church has a constitutional 
right to govern itself is to give constitutional stature to entities un- 
known to the constitution, and perhaps establish a religion into 
the bargain. But to say simply that a citizen has a constitutional 
right to organize a self-governing church is to belie the posture of 
the typical litigation (in which the church itself in its corporate 
capacity is one of the parties), and in general to give a false picture 
of what we are doing. 
It is not easy, for instance, to see what natural person had his 
religious freedom enhanced by the Kedroff decision,32 in which 
281 d. at 6o6. 
29 Brundage v. Deardoff, 55 Fed. 839 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893), cited 89 Sup. Ct. 605. 
30 89 Sup. Ct. at 606. 
31 Supra, note 25. 
32Supra, note 20. 
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the Supreme Court held that constitutional religious freedom re- 
quired the states to follow Watson v. Jones. Let us look at the 
case. In issue was the possession of the Russian Orthodox 
cathedral in New York City. On one side was Kedroff, backed by 
a quarter century and more of litigation, and by the venerable 
authority of the Moscow Patriarch. On the other side was almost 
the entire community of Russian Orthodox adherents in the United 
States, who had formed an independent church government in the 
'twenties, on the theory that the Patriarch was too far under the 
control of the Soviet government to be an effective shepherd of an 
American (and White Russian) flock. Both the courts and the 
legislature of New York, sharing the concern with Soviet domi- 
nation of the Moscow Patriarch, had done all they could to turn 
Kedroff out of the cathedral and put the American churchmen in. 
To no avail. A majority of the Supreme Court, following Wat- 
son v. Jones, decided in favor of Kedroff. The Russian Orthodox 
Church, they said, was a hierarchical church, and the Moscow 
Patriarch was its top hierarch. For New York to subvert the 
Patriarch's authority was a violation of the religious freedom 
guaranteed by the federal constitution. While the opinions on the 
prevailing side pay some attention to property concepts, their 
general thrust is in the direction of freedom for the church and 
forbearance by the state: 
There are occasions when civil courts must draw lines between the 
responsibilities of church and state for the disposition or use of 
property. Even in those cases when the property right follows as an 
incident from decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical 
issues, the church rule controls. This under our Constitution neces- 
sarily follows in order that there may be free exercise of religion. - 
Mr. Justice Reed for the majority.33 
St. Nicholas Cathedral is not just a piece of real estate. . . . A 
cathedral is the seat and center of ecclesiastical authority. . . . What 
is at stake here is the power to exercise religious authority. That is 
the essence of this controversy. - Mr. Justice Frankfurter con- 
curring.34 
Mr. Justice Jackson, insisting that the devolution of New York 
'33344 U.S. at 120--21. 
34 Id. at 121. 
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real estate should be governed by New York law, underscored the 
presuppositions of the majority by dissenting from them: 
I do not see how one can spell out of the principles of separation of 
church and state a doctrine that a state submit property rights to 
settlement by canon law.35 
In fine, the decision seems to be recognized by all concerned as 
holding that constitutional religious freedom requires the un- 
impeded exercise of ecclesiastical authority. 
Well, then, let us return to the question: what natural person 
has his religious freedom enhanced by the principle in question? 
The only answer anyone has proposed is a natural person who has 
opted for a hierarchical church and contributed of his fortune to 
supply its material needs. But St. Nicholas Cathedral was built 
in 1903, when the chief rule in the Russian Orthodox Church was 
borne by the Czar. The Patriarchal throne had been vacant since 
the time of Peter the Great and its functions exercised by a Synod, 
headed up by the Czar's Procurator. The New York law under 
which the cathedral congregation was incorporated left the final 
say in disputed matters to the Czar's consul in New York City. 
If those who contributed their money to the Building Fund in 
those far-off days had been asked what they would want done in 
the event the Czar were to be overthrown by an atheist govern- 
ment, and the Patriarchate to be established in subservience to 
that government, what would they have said? The best answer is 
probably provided by what they in fact did twenty years after the 
cathedral was built - just what their Russian ancestors did, 
incidentally, when Constantinople fell to the Turks.3" 
The question is not whether Kedroff was rightly decided in 
view of this state of affairs, but what kind of freedom it may be 
said to have recognized. My point is that to speak of the freedom 
of a group of citizens to practice their religion requires a some- 
what contorted analysis of the case, whereas to speak of the free- 
MId. at 126, 131. 
a See the same case below, 302 N.Y. I (1950): "The Russian Church originally 
was subject to the Patriarch of Constantinople but acquired greater autonomy when 
Constantinople fell to the Turks and the Metropolitan of Moscow was no longer 
appointed by the Patriarch of Constantinople but was elected by the Russian 
bishops." 
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dom of the Russian Orthodox Church to govern itself according 
to its canons does not. 
This freedom of ecclesiastical processes to move in an area 
where secular processes cannot follow seems to be a High Church 
freedom. It is less reminiscent of traditional Bill of Rights learn- 
ing than of the medieval conception of libertas ecclesiae. Gregory 
VII (1073-85) based the High Church movement that bears his 
name on an understanding of libertas as a state of affairs in which 
each of the several parts of a divinely ordered universe moved 
without hindrance in its appointed sphere."3 It was on this basis 
that he (and his successors for many a generation) conceived of 
the church as standing over against secular society, suitably re- 
stricting the things that are Caesar's, and claiming as its own the 
things that are God's. 
Needless to say, this High Church conception was not fully 
viable in Gregory's time, as it is not fully viable today. The medi- 
eval bishop was sometimes treated as an ambassador of God, but 
he was sometimes treated also as a magnate competing with other 
magnates for the available resources of society. He was sometimes 
a judge in his own tribunals, sometimes a litigant in the king's. So 
in our time, the various manifestations of the institutional church 
are sometimes groups of citizens on their lawful occasions, making 
only those claims on the state that any citizens do who are pur- 
suing happiness in their own way - and sometimes a presence in 
human affairs which cannot be ignored, but which transcends the 
regulatory powers of the state. 
B. Tax Exemption 
Churches have been wholly or partially exempt from secular 
taxes since the time of Constantine at least; only the most rigorous 
ideologues feel that such exemption violates state or federal con- 
stitutional provisions. The most recent judicial word on the sub- 
ject is that of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Murray v. 
3 GERD TELLENBACH, Church, State, and Christian Society, Bennet ed. & tr. 
(Oxford, O.U.P., 1959). Instructive on this point is Frankfurter's language, 344 
U.S. at 123-24, analogizing the action of the New York authorities to the German 
Kulturkampf of the 1870's, and to other disputes "not unfairly attributable to a 
claim by the State of comprehensive loyalty, undeflected by the competing claims 
of religious faith." 
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Comptroller of the Treasury (1966).3S Madalyn Murray, Balti- 
more's indefatigable nemesis of the spiritual estate, fresh from a 
notable triumph over Bible reading in the schools,39 brought the 
action as a taxpayer: her share of the burdens of government was 
the more in that the churches' was the less. She was the victim 
either of an arbitrary classification or of an establishment of 
religion. 
Not so, said the Court. The state may bestow its tax exemp- 
tions wherever it has a legitimate public purpose in doing so. 
While the promotion of religion, as such, cannot be a legitimate 
public purpose because of the nonestablishment clause,40 a variety 
of secular purposes are served by religious organizations. These 
the state can legitimately promote or permit the citizens to 
promote without paying taxes. If such purposes are so intertwined 
with religious activities that the latter cannot conveniently be 
separately taxed, the state may exempt the organization entirely. 
Note the Erastian tenor of the argument so far. 
But there is another line of argument. Several amici curiae have 
urged, the Court points out, that not to grant tax exemption to a 
church violates the free exercise clause of the constitution. This 
argument has some support in Justice Douglas' 1943 opinion in 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania 4~ (a difficult case, which I shall take up 
at length below). The Court in Mrs. Murray's case was not will- 
ing to pass on this argument one way or the other, beyond saying 
that it was plausible enough to be taken into account by the 
legislature in deciding to grant the exemption. Here, of course, 
is a solidly High Church contention, with roots in the anathemas 
of Boniface VIII: 
That laymen have been very hostile to clerks antiquity relates, which 
too the experiences of modern times manifestly declare, whilst not 
content with their own bounds they strive for the forbidden and loose 
the reins for things unlawful. Nor do they prudently consider how 
power over clerks or ecclesiastical persons or goods is forbidden them: 
38 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897 (1966). 
3 Mrs. Murray's case was a companion case to School District of Abington 
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
4o Earlier cases would probably not make this concession. See the quote at 
STOKES, III, 419. 
413i9 U.S. 105 (I943). 
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they impose heavy burdens on the prelates of the churches and 
ecclesiastical persons regular and secular, and tax them, and impose 
collections. . . . - Clericis Laicos 42 (1296). 
"Very hostile to clerks" seems a legitimate characterization of 
Mrs. Murray. 
So the upshot of the Murray case is that it is no establishment of 
religion to exempt churches from taxation, because they serve a 
variety of secular purposes; and it just might be an interference 
with free exercise to tax them, because they are religious. The 
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.43 
The Erastian interpretation of the tax exemption is borne out 
by a series of cases involving the exemption of atheistic organiza- 
tions. Where such organizations gather for moral exhortation, 
hymn-singing, and the like, they are typically exempted from 
taxation on the ground that their activities, as one court put it, 
are analogous to the activities, serve the same place in the lives of 
[their] members, and occupy the same place in society, as the ac- 
tivities of the theistic churches.44 
The general idea seems again to be that we are dealing with a way 
of pursuing happiness, that the more innocuous and high-minded 
of the pursuits of the citizenry ought to have this public encourage- 
ment because an innocuous and high-minded people is what we 
aspire to be. Another court referred to the "context of exemption 
to art galleries libraries, public charities hospitals schools and 
colleges," and inferred a "broad legislative purpose to grant sup- 
port to elements in the community regarded as good for the com- 
munity." 45 
These cases generally suppose that the exemption accorded the 
atheist organization is a matter of constitutional right - that if 
the theistic religion were given a status denied the atheist, there 
would be a forbidden establishment of religion. This again relates 
42 Corpus Juris Canonici, Canon 3, Book III, title 23 in Sext. Translation from 
Documents Illustrative of English Church History, Gee and Hardy eds. (London, 
Macmillan, 1896), 87. 
43385 U.S. 816 (1968). 
"4 Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App.2d 673, 315 P.2d 
394, 4o9-1o (1957). 
45Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 
1957). 
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to the fundamental Erastian insight that the church is one of a 
variety of institutions through which society pursues its goals. 
This makes the nonestablishment clause an Erastian principle. A 
benefit conferred on the church is free of the charge of establish- 
ment as long as the church is only one among the institutions on 
which the benefit is conferred. 
But the notion, relied on to an indeterminate extent in Murray, 
that secular activities of churches form the basis of the exemption 
must be taken with a grain of salt. Instructive in this regard is 
the provision in the Internal Revenue Code for taxing "unrelated 
business income" of tax-exempt organizations.4" This provision, 
enacted in i951 to plug a substantial loophole in the existing law, 
imposes a tax on income made by a tax-exempt organization in a 
business that does not relate to the tax-exempt purpose except 
as a source of funds. But there is exempted from this tax the 
unrelated business income made by "a church, a convention or as- 
sociation of churches. .. ." 'YThe committee reports," a sub- 
stantial article on the subject remarks, "are barren of any state- 
ment of the reason for this." " 
The Internal Revenue Service has defined a church, for pur- 
poses of this exemption, to be a body that performs ministerial or 
sacerdotal services, or conducts religious worship. The Christian 
Brothers, proud heirs of a long tradition of ecclesiastical wine- 
making, but alas, no priests, tried to get around this definition, 
but could not.4" As matters now stand, the Jesuits, by reason of 
their priesthood, enjoy the exemption, whereas the good Brothers, 
lacking the sacred unction, do not. 
It seems unlikely (as well as unconstitutional) that Congress 
felt that religious worship was more deserving of encouragement 
than education or the relief of the poor. Rather, it seems they felt 
more diffident about taxing religious worship than they did about 
taxing equally worthy but more clearly secular works. In short, 
we may see in the contours of this exemption once again the mark 
of a High Church view. 
4 United States Internal Revenue Code (1954), ?511. 
4, MOORE and DOHAN, Sales, Churches, and Monkeyshines, Tax Law Review ii 
(1955), 87, Io3. 
4 De La Salle Institute v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal., 1961). 
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But is this touch-not-my-anointed view of tax exemption built 
into the free exercise clause of the federal Constitution? The 
answer to this question must be found, if at all, in an analysis of 
the 1943 case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.49 The case involved 
a city ordinance imposing a license tax on itinerant peddlers - 
from $I.50 to $20.00, depending on how long they stayed in town. 
Murdock was a Jehovah's Witness, who sold (or sometimes gave) 
Bibles, Watchtowers, and the like to those he visited in his door- 
to-door evangelism. The city fathers thought this made him an 
itinerant peddler of Bibles and Watchtowers, subject to the same 
license tax as an itinerant peddler of anything else. 
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a bare majority of the Court 
(himself, Stone, C.J., Black, Murphy, and Rutledge, JJ.) held that 
the tax could not be applied to Murdock. Door-to-door distribu- 
tion of the printed word, he said, was a traditional means of spread- 
ing a religion - as much so as preaching or holding revival meet- 
ings. To make the right to engage in such activities depend on 
getting a license and paying a tax is to interfere with the free 
exercise of religion. The fact that Murdock made a financial re- 
turn from selling these books and pamphlets did not matter. 
"Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are 
available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way." 50 
Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Roberts, JJ., dissented in a 
number of opinions. They felt that an itinerant evangelist should 
bear his fair share of the burdens of government like any other 
man, and that if a tax was not set so high as to be a prohibition 
and did not single out a constitutionally protected activity for a 
special burden, it could not be said to violate constitutional free- 
doms. 
There seem to me to be three main lines of argument for saying 
that Murdock did not write Clericis Laicos into the free exercise 
clause. None of them is altogether convincing: 
i. The prevailing opinion says: 
We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free 
from all financial burdens of government. . . . We have here some- 
thing quite different, for example, from a tax on the income of one 
49 39 U.S. 105 (1943). 
'Id. at III. 
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who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or em- 
ployed in connection with these activities. It is one thing to tax the 
income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact 
a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon.51 
The exact nature of the distinction suggested here is a little diffi- 
cult to see, and it becomes a good deal more so after it is subjected 
to the remorseless logic of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting 
opinion.52 
2. The language about "conditioning" the religious activity on 
the payment of a tax is somewhat reminiscent of the doctrine in 
the free speech cases that "prior restraints" are more objection- 
able than consequences visited after the event. Arguably, then, the 
state under Murdock can tax a man for having sold Watchtowers 
(by imposing a sales tax, for instance), but cannot make him pay 
before he sells. This argument has against it the fact that the prior 
restraint approach has not stood up very well in free-speech cases 
- most speech, if it is protected at all, is now protected after the 
event as well as before. At any rate, the "condition" test could 
be applied to most kinds of taxation. For instance, if a church 
building could be sold off in a tax sale, it is hard to see that paying 
the tax would not be a condition imposed on continuing to worship 
there. 
3. The prevailing opinion in Murdock was very careful to put 
freedom of religion on the same footing with freedom of the press 
- as, indeed, most of the religion cases in the '40's were.53 But if 
the constitutional tax immunity of a church is no greater than 
that of a newspaper, it is not very great. In fact, though, the fol- 
low-up case of Follett v. McCormick "4 (i944) seems to drop the 
5 Id. at 112. 
52Id. at 134, especially 136-37: "Nor, as I have indicated, can a tax be invali- 
dated because the exercise of a constitutional privilege is conditioned upon its pay- 
ment. It depends upon the nature of the condition that is imposed, its justification, 
and the extent to which it hinders or restricts the exercise of the privilege." 
"s HOWE, supra, note 7, at 9I1-I8. 
"4321 U.S. 573 (I944). The facts differed from those in Murdock only in that 
here the Jehovah's Witness involved was not an itinerant, but worked full time in 
the community that endeavored to tax him. A dissenting opinion by Roberts, Jack- 
son, and Frankfurter, JJ., 319 U.S. at 579, 581-82, suggested that the entire publi- 
cation industry would have to be afforded the immunity established in the pre- 
vailing opinion. The majority did not address this point. 
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talk about the press. Since Sherbert v. Verner 55 (1963) it would 
be hard to go on saying the two freedoms were the same. 
Putting all these arguments together it seems to me we will have 
to say that the church has a constitutional right to some but not 
all of the tax immunity it now enjoys. I should think that a tax on 
investment property or investment income, a nondiscriminatory 
sales tax on Bibles, Watchtowers, crucifixes or rosary beads would 
be constitutional, whereas a tax on real estate used for religious 
worship or sepulture, a personal property tax on reliquaries or 
chalices, or an income tax on the contents of the collection plate 
would interfere with the free exercise of religion.5" 
Further, it seems that such constitutional right to exemption as 
the church has is not shared with other constitutionally protected 
activities, but belongs to the church precisely because it is the 
church - because it deals with a dimension of human existence 
that the Founding Fathers intended to shield from government 
intervention. However hard we try, we cannot think of a personal 
property tax on a typewriter as all of a piece with one on a set of 
Communion plate. 
In the end, it seems to me, the law treats tax exemption in about 
the same way it treats intra-church disputes. Its main thrust in 
both cases is Erastian. It recognizes the church as one of the 
institutions through which citizens engage in their harmless or 
commendable pursuits. It recognizes the support and encourage- 
ment of such institutions as high on the list of proper functions 
of government. But in both cases there is a core of High Church 
doctrine in the authorities, doctrine which sees the ambit of the 
55374 U.S. 398 (1963). The case holds that persons with religious scruples 
against obeying a law may have a constitutional right to exemption where others 
would have no such right. Thus, it is a drastic departure from the doctrine of the 
'40's, as represented by West Virginia Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943), where the court established the right of a Jehovah's Witness not to salute 
the flag by holding that everyone has a right not to salute the flag. The religious 
right in Barnette was assimilated to free speech by saying that free speech included 
freedom not to speak, and therefore freedom not to salute the flag. But if freedom 
of religion is conceived in terms of Sherbert, no comparable free speech analogues 
can be developed. 
~ The conclusions set forth in PFEFFER, 603, seem to accord fairly well with 
mine. It is interesting also that President Grant, an early proponent of doing away 
with general tax exemption for churches, was prepared to exempt "the last resting- 
place of the dead, and possibly, with proper restrictions, church edifices." Quoted 
Id. at i88. 
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church as standing both constitutionally and philosophically out- 
side the scope of the princes of this world. 
C. Financial Support 
The expanded financial involvement of government in all as- 
pects of public life has meant that a good many ecclesiastical 
projects of the kind alluded to by Mr. Baird are now receiving a 
measure of support from state or federal funds. Since taxes come 
out of the same pockets as private benefactions, it is more or less 
inevitable that this should be the case - the more money govern- 
ment spends, the less private agencies can raise and the more tax 
money they must have if they are to survive. 
Government response to this need is by now substantial in 
amount, although somewhat haphazard in form. The federal 
government, and most of the states, subsidize denominational 
hospitals on the same terms as any others."' The Anti-Poverty 
Program involves church-related agencies in all kinds of ways, 
subject to a fairly elaborate set of provisions that prevent federal 
funds from being used for proselytism or religious worship."5 The 
Education title of the United States Code Annotated contains a 
rich variety of provisions whereby denominational institutions 
can be supported in one or another of their numerous concerns. 
Here, the big money is for colleges, but there are a number of 
special projects (e.g., the furnishing of teachers for the children 
of migrant agricultural workers) in which church-related ele- 
mentary schools can share.59 A number of states provide lunches, 
health services, audio-visual aids, textbooks, or bus transportation 
for such schools.60 
Needless to say, the justification offered for all this support is 
Erastian. Functions in which the public is interested are sup- 
57PFEFFER, I73-79. The federal law on the point is found in United States 
Code, title 42, ?? 291, 291d. 
'Office of Economic Opportunity Community Action Program Guide (1965), 
99-100oo. 
5 United States Code, title 20, ?? 445, 611, 671, 751, 952(e), II07a, 1205(a) (5) 
are examples of provisions making private schools eligible for the various programs 
to which they apply. 
' ANSON PHELPS STOKES and LEO PFEFFER, Church and State in the United 
States, revised ed. (New York, Harper & Row, 1964). 
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ported equally whether or not they are carried out under religious 
auspices. Citizens who do certain things in a religious way are 
given the same support they would be given if they did the same 
things in a secular way. The two Supreme Court cases of Brad- 
field v. Roberts 61 (1899) and Cochran v. Louisiana State Board 
of Education 62 (1930) state the arguments clearly and succinctly. 
Bradfield involved a substantial appropriation by Congress to 
enable a Catholic hospital in Washington to expand its facilities 
for the benefit of indigent patients sent by the District of Colum- 
bia Commissioners. The hospital was run by a membership cor- 
poration chartered for the purpose under secular law. It just so 
happened that the members of the corporation were all nuns. The 
Court felt that this fact made no difference: 
That the influence of any particular church may be powerful over the 
members of a non-sectarian and secular corporation, incorporated for 
a certain defined purpose and with clearly stated powers, is surely not 
sufficient o convert such a corporation into a religious or sectarian 
body.63 
As they were a secular corporation performing a public purpose, 
there was no obstacle to providing them with public funds. 
Cochran involved a state providing free textbooks for school- 
children, regardless of the kind of schools they attended. It was 
contended that the statute, insofar as it conferred benefits on 
parochial students, was unconstitutional. The Court held, how- 
ever, that as everyone got the same books, and none of the books 
in question was religious, there could be no question of support- 
ing religious education, or of diverting public funds to a private 
purpose. 
To this day, those who support the spending of public funds for 
this or that ecclesiastical project make their case with arguments 
like those just set forth." Indeed, some carry the argument one 
step farther and insist that to exclude an activity from govern- 
ment support simply because it is carried out under religious 
61175 U.S. 291 (I899). 
* 281 U.S. 370 (1930). 
S175 U.S. at 298. 
"Including the Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 
(1968), which came down while I was preparing this article. 
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auspices is to practice an improper, if not unconstitutional, form of 
discrimination: 
In the event that a Federal Aid Program is enacted which excludes 
children in private schools these children will be the victims of dis- 
criminatory legislation. There will be no alternative but to oppose 
such discrimination.65 
In fact, it is this very discrimination which the opponents of 
public support not only favor but insist is constitutionally re- 
quired. For them, the fact that an otherwise innocuous activity 
is carried on under religious auspices creates an overriding objec- 
tion to public support for it, an objection that rests on the hal- 
lowed traditions of our fathers. The best statement of the view in 
question is that of Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in the Everson 
school bus case (1947)."* A bare majority of the Court, speaking 
through Mr. Justice Black, had held that New Jersey might in- 
clude parochial students in a general program of tax-supported 
transportation to and from school. The majority found a public 
purpose served in a nondiscriminatory way. Rutledge met the 
argument head-on: 
Stripped of its religious phase, the case presents no substantial federal 
question. . . . The public function argument, by casting the issue in 
terms of promoting the general cause of education and the welfare of 
the individual, ignores the religious factor and its essential connection 
with the transportation, thereby leaving out the only vital element in 
the case. 
.... 
To say that New Jersey's appropriation and her use 
of the power of taxation for raising the funds appropriated are not for 
public purposes but are for private ends, is to say that they are for the 
support of religion and religious teaching. Conversely, to say that 
they are for public purposes is to say that they are not for religious 
ones.67 
Behind this reasoning Rutledge places Madison's Virginia Remon- 
strance (1785), which he reads into the First Amendment through 
Madison's part in the enactment of the latter. He finds in the 
" Quoted in STOKES and PFEFFER, op. cit. supra, note 60, at 442. 
66330 U.S. I, 28. 
67 Id. at 50-51. 
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public purpose argument of the majority the same view that was 
put forward in the proposed legislation against which the Remon- 
strance was addressed: 
Whereas the general diffusion of Christian knowledge hath a natural 
tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain their vices, and pre- 
serve the peace of society. . 
..s 
Such a view implies for Madison, as the majority view here does 
for Rutledge, 
that the Civil Magistrate . . . may employ Religion as an engine of 
Civil policy.69 
This view Madison considers "an unhallowed perversion of the 
means of salvation." 
Our constitutional policy, [Rutledge insists] is exactly the opposite. 
It does not deny the value or necessity for religious training, teaching, 
or observance. But to that end it does deny that the state can sustain 
them in any form or degree. For this reason the sphere of religious 
activity, as distinguished from the secular intellectual liberties, has 
been given the twofold protection [i.e., free exercise and no establish- 
ment] and, as the state cannot forbid, neither can it perform or aid in 
performing the religious function. The dual prohibition makes that 
function altogether private. ... It is not because religious teaching 
does not promote the public or the individual's welfare, but because 
neither is furthered when the state promotes religious education, that 
the Constitution forbids it to do so.70 
To sum up his argument on this point, Rutledge says: 
The realm of religious training and belief remains, as the Amendment 
made it, the kingdom of the individual and his God. It should be 
kept inviolably private. . . .' 
Rutledge's strictures can be taken in either of two ways. On the 
one hand, we may consider them a simple affirmation of Baird's 
Voluntary Principle as the essential American version of the 
Erastian tradition. The language about religion being a public 
68 Id. at 5In. 
69 Id. at 41n. 
7o Id. at 52. 
711d. at 57-58. 
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purpose but one the government cannot promote seems to call for 
this interpretation. On the other hand, the language about "the 
kingdom of the individual and his God," taken together with the 
quoting of Madison's remarks about "an unhallowed perversion 
of the means of salvation," seems to go deeper, to envisage a realm 
in which not merely the government but the secular common- 
wealth as such can have no place. This, of course, in its implica- 
tions, is High Church. 
The first, or Erastian-Voluntary, interpretation is becoming in- 
creasingly difficult to maintain in a period when so many secular 
aspects of the free enterprise system are receiving government 
support. It seems that if our basic social functions are to go on 
being performed at the grass-roots level by a system of local and 
voluntary institutions, the system will have to be supported at 
crucial points by a judicious input of government funds. And if 
free church institutions are to grow and keep pace with the rest of 
the system, they will have to be subsidized when the occasion 
arises, along with the rest. T6 cut them off from the money in this 
day and age is to distinguish them radically from the other institu- 
tions of society, and thus deny the Erastian presupposition on 
which the Voluntary Principle was based. 
So, however Rutledge may have conceived himself, I think we 
will have to conceive him in High Church terms. If ecclesiastical 
projects are to be cut off from government funds, it is because they 
occupy a place in the lives of men where the concerns of secular 
government cannot follow them. 
We do not seem prepared on the whole to take any of the above 
arguments to its logical conclusion in our national life. On the 
one side, there is a group called Citizens for Educational Freedom, 
which insists that private schools do the same job as public schools 
and should have the same support. But in practice, their political 
projects have been limited to the customary auxiliary services 
plus token subsidies in cash, and even with these they have had no 
great success. On the other side, a few civil libertarians, and even 
a churchman or two, have questioned the constitutionality of 
federal funds for church-related hospitals, or the development of 
urban renewal lands by church-related universities. But for the 
most part they have not made much of an impression. 
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There are, it seems to me, two main principles to be discerned 
in our actual practice concerning state support for church-con- 
nected projects. The first is that the forms of public support which 
characterized the state establishments of the post-Colonial period 
or which fueled the Protestant-Catholic conflicts of the nineteenth 
century are generally to be avoided. This is why church-con- 
nected colleges fare better with the public purse than church-con- 
nected grade schools do. The principle has no logical basis; it 
represents simply a desire to avoid what experience has shown to 
be messy. 
The other principle, more strictly ideological, is that the church's 
work of religious worship and instruction cannot, as such, be 
subsidized.72 This principle makes its way into the law in a num- 
ber of ways - the provisions, for example, that keep anti-poverty 
money from being used for such purposes, or the provision that 
funds made available for graduate study in the humanities are not 
to be used for graduate theological study.73 This limitation meets 
with general acceptance, even from those who think religion is 
good for the state. When it comes to the realms of religious wor- 
ship and instruction (the very realms, by the way, that we saw 
could probably not constitutionally be taxed), we are ready to 
agree with Rutledge that they are "the kingdom of the individual 
and his God" or at least the kingdom of the individual and his 
church. 
There is, then, in the area of state support just what there is in 
the other areas we have been considering. There is a main stream 
of Erastian rhetoric and practice, represented in this case by the 
public purpose arguments of Bradfield, Cochran, and the Everson 
majority, and by the reading of Rutledge's dissent that holds the 
Voluntary Principle to be a constitutional tradition. And there is 
a central core of High Church ideology that keeps the state out 
of the church's central concerns, that guards the borders of the 
kingdom of the individual and his God, that saves the means of 
salvation from unhallowed perversion. 
72The one serious exception is presented by military chaplains. On this, see 
PFEFFER, 151, 217f. 
3 United States Code, title 20, ? 1116. 
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III 
ERASTIAN FORMS 
A. Social Service 
The bread-and-butter Christianity of our people seems to accord 
pretty much with the church-state doctrines of our courts. That 
is, if we look hard enough, we can find latent in the witness of most 
churches a High Church vision of a transcendent order standing 
over against society. But their day-to-day understanding of what 
they are about is characterized by an Erastian acceptance of a 
place among the various institutions by which an overall and 
traditionally Christian society underwrites the pursuit of happi- 
ness by its members. Even in the Sunday and holy-day realm of 
religious worship, we are apt to think only secondarily about the 
sovereign demands of God, to think primarily about the means of 
grace or the sources of spiritual sustenance,74 as if the pursuit of 
happiness in the next world were all of a piece with the pursuit of 
it in this. 
The functions we attribute to our churches in this context are 
not unlike those envisaged by Baird and Carroll in the last century, 
or, indeed, those envisaged by the English commons in i306. In 
the first place, we expect the church to call down the divine blessing 
on our public and private undertakings - much as the medieval 
peasant expected the priest to bless his sick cattle or pray for a 
bountiful harvest. So the minister, priest, or rabbi is appropriately 
called in for the laying of a cornerstone, or to give that peculiar 
combination of prayer and sermon called an "invocation" at a 
banquet. 
Next, as our medieval forefathers expected the church "to teach 
them and the people the laws of God," so we expect it to provide 
suitable moral instruction to make good neighbors and good 
citizens of us all. In conjunction with this endeavor, the churches 
maintain a general educational enterprise parallel to that main- 
" Looking more or less at random for the sort of thing I have in mind, I turned 
to the "Church Organizations" entry in the South Bend, Indiana, telephone book 
on my desk. It has a quarter-page advertisement, compliments of the telephone 
company, saying: "Go to the Church of your choice . . . Take someone with you, 
you'll both be richer for it . . 
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tained by the state and by private secular institutions. For the 
most part, even those who oppose government financial support 
for this enterprise recognize its value to the community. 
Then, "to make hospitalities, alms, and other works of charity" 
is a function of the church today, just as it was in 1306. These 
works involve a rich variety of economic, social, and civic con- 
cerns, just as they did in Baird's time. Probably they are shared 
more today than formerly with governmental and secular organ- 
izations, but it is generally recognized that the church was first in 
the field, and is still entitled to an honored place. 
To bring home the complexity of these concerns, let me sketch 
in briefly the situation in the community in which I live. There 
are two main hospitals in town; one is run by an order of nuns; 
the other by a nonprofit secular corporation. The two main child 
placement agencies are the Catholic Charities and the County 
Welfare Department. Traditional down-and-out types are dealt 
with by a traditional Protestant mission for the purpose. I would 
not try to enumerate the agencies that deal with various aspects 
of the race problem, but they include both the NAACP and the 
Catholic Interracial Council. The latter (like the Presbyterian 
Players, one of the two amateur theatrical groups in town) has 
a broad nonsectarian membership, and seems under no kind of 
control from the parent religious body. A number of other church 
projects seem to be in the same case. I know, for instance, of a 
Boy Scout troop that transferred from the sponsorship of a pub- 
lic school to that of a Methodist church without any appreciable 
change in personnel or program. 
If I am beginning to sound like Baird, I have made my point 
about the continuity of the tradition Baird represents. 
There is one other element in church support of civic and so- 
cial activities that is generally overlooked. That is the payment 
of the salaries of the clergy. A good clergyman is apt to be con- 
cerned with a variety of civic projects, especially those involving 
race and poverty. His participation differs from that of ordinary 
Christian laymen in that it is generally regarded as part of his 
job, and yet takes nothing out of the funds available for a given 
project. The layman, unless he is paid, can be concerned with a 
civic project only in his "spare time." 
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Obtaining unpaid personnel for secular pursuits by expanding 
the vocational role of the clergy is not a new expedient. Most 
of the governmental services of the Middle Ages were staffed by 
means of it. So were many of the educational services of a more 
recent period. Not new either is the justification offered for such 
an expanded clerical role: a pursuit where dedicated Christian 
service is appropriate is a pursuit proper to be carried on through 
a clerical staff. The ever-optimistic Pere Thomassin, writing in 
the seventeenth century, gave a justification for the clerical bu- 
reaucrat of the Middle Ages that could almost serve for the cleri- 
cal NAACP leader of today: 
**. an opportunity to exercise their charity, to sanctify the court, 
to make of the kings' palace a sanctuary of piety, to purify tasks which 
are in themselves profane, to govern the world according to the laws 
of heaven, to make the truths and maxims of the Gospel prevail in 
the conduct of human affairs, finally, to make of Christian monarchies, 
with the concurrence of the monarchs, a kind of theocracy, or divine 
government.75 
The part about kings and courts would have to be brought up to 
date, and there are some distinctions between the sacred and the 
profane that are no longer in good repute; but the part about 
making the truths and maxims of the Gospel prevail in the con- 
duct of human affairs - really the crux of the matter - is as 
persuasive as it ever was. 
I do not mean to fault either the medieval or the modern cleric 
for his acceptance of this rationale. For one reason or another, 
it has never been found possible to organize the central works of 
the ministry - preaching, catechizing, and conducting religious 
worship - in such a way that all those engaged in these works 
can keep themselves busy doing nothing else. Accordingly, the 
clergy as a class have had to choose between working only part- 
time at their calling and accepting from the surrounding society 
an expanded definition of the calling itself. The latter alternative 
has generally seemed more in keeping with the dignity of the 
ministry. And if the minister's calling must be redefined to make 
75Louis THOMASSIN, Ancienne et Nouvelle Discipline de l'Aglise, Andre ed. 
(Bar-le Duc, Guerin, 1867), VII, 343 (my translation). 
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a full-time job of it, the way we are redefining it in our society, 
in terms of supporting causes that otherwise lack a sufficient 
economic base, seems as good a way as any. 
The other forms of civic involvement of the churches as I have 
been describing them have also a good deal to be said in their 
favor. If the projects in question were all conducted under gov- 
ernmental auspices, they would become disagreeably centralized, 
probably with a considerable loss of grass-roots support for them. 
And even if they were carried out by nonprofit secular corpora- 
tions, the quality of our support for them would suffer. The par- 
ticipation of the churches in civic projects gives a certain religious 
sanction to all such projects, under whatever auspices they are 
conducted; it reminds us that they can be carried out from re- 
ligious motives. Erastianism, in short, is a two-way street. If it 
carries a danger of secularizing the churches, it carries also a 
hope of sanctifying the world. 
B. Social Criticism 
The approach of the main-stream churches to what Canon 
Stokes calls "national issues" - issues, that is, involving the 
moral order of society as well as the moral choices of individuals 
--has characteristically involved two elements. First, there is 
a judicious affirmation of relevant moral principles with due re- 
gard to the complexities of putting them into practice: 
The Synod. . . . recommend it to all their people to use the most 
prudent measures, consistent with the interest and the state of civil 
society, in the counties where they live, to procure eventually the 
abolition of slavery in America. (Presbyterians, 1787) 76 
Although history plainly testifies that the Church has always be- 
friended the poor and laboring classes, and effectually procured the 
mitigation of the evils attached to serviture, until through her mild 
influence it has passed away from the nations of Europe, yet she has 
never disturbed established order, or endangered the peace of society, 
by following theories of philanthropy. (Roman Catholics, I858) 77 
We, therefore, affectionately admonish all our preachers and people 
" 
STOKES, II, I3 7. 
77 Id., 187-88. 
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to keep themselves pure from this great evil [slavery], and to seek its 
extirpation by all lawful and Christian means. (Methodists, i86o) 78 
In the effort to establish a criterion or standard of measurement of 
wages, it is necessary to consider not only the needs of the working- 
man, but also the state of the business or industry in which he labors. 
(Roman Catholics, 1940) 79 
Beverage alcohol is a serious social problem and cannot be ignored. It 
is also a complex problem and cannot be solved at once. (Federal 
Council of Churches, 1946) 80 
Concomitantly, when specific courses of action or specific legis- 
lative goals consistent with the underlying principles appear to 
be within the range of practical possibility, the spiritual prestige 
and moral fervor of the church is apt to be directed to imple- 
menting them: 
The undersigned, clergymen of different religious denominations in 
New England, hereby, in the name of Almighty God, and in his pres- 
ence, do solemnly protest against the passage of what is known as 
the Nebraska Bill, or any repeal or modification of the existing legal 
prohibitions of slavery in that part of our national domain which it is 
proposed to organize into the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas. 
(petition to Congress, 1854) 81 
It is therefore urged that on some fixed day preceding the then pend- 
ing Louisiana election, from the pulpits of the whole land an appeal 
should be made to the Christian conscience and purse. (an account of 
the defeat of a state lottery in Louisiana, I894) 82 
The forces of organized religion in America are now warranted in de- 
claring that this morally indefensible regime of the twelve-hour day 
must come to an end. (joint statement of Federal Council of Churches, 
National Catholic Welfare Conference, and Central Conference of 
American Rabbis, on the steel industry, 1923) 83 
Be it Resolved, That the Executive Committee of the Federal Council 
of Churches, realizing that lynching has become a national shame, 
78 Id., 167. 
79 Id., III, 91. 
" Id., II, 344. 
81Id., 196. 
82 Id., 298. 
* Id., 350. 
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believes that national legislation is a moral necessity to bring the 
Federal Government into prompt and effective cooperation with state 
and local authorities in the prevention of lynching and the prosecution 
of lynchers. (934) 84 
We believe that there are certain measures which can be initiated now 
or in the near future which can reduce some of the evil effects of 
alcohol. . . . The following are, for the present, our operating prin- 
ciples for social control: 
i. Revision of the alcoholic beverage tax structure. ... .(seven 
specific proposals all told - Federal Council of Churches, 1946) 85 
I'd like to vote against it [the Civil Rights Act of 1964], but I can't. 
The church groups are on my tail. (a Congressman) 86 
This stance of the churches on social problems has been criticized 
from two directions. On the one hand, the promotion of specific, 
and therefore contingent, political or social programs can be re- 
garded as a diversion of the moral force of the Gospel. A Meth- 
odist critic of his church's part in the presidential campaign of 
1928 puts it this way: 
Preachers are accustomed to speak with dogmatism the truths of re- 
ligion, and they should so speak, and when they make stump speeches, 
they use the same dogmatism, although they are then in the field where 
differences of convictions exist between equally good men. There has 
never been in the United States a political battle in which there were 
not equally good men on opposite sides, but this fact, preachers turned 
politicians, are almost sure to forget.87 
Conversely, the concern of the church with politics can be faulted 
for its inevitable recognition that politics is the art of the pos- 
sible. Here is the judgment of the Abolitionist prophet Garrison 
on the judicious efforts of churchmen to ameliorate the evils of 
slavery: 
Resolved: That (making all due allowance for exceptional cases) the 
American Church continues to be the bulwark of slavery, and there- 
84 Id., 377. 
SId., 343. 
*LEE E. DIRKS, Religion in Action (Silver Spring, Md., National Observer, 
1965), 147. 
' STOKES, II, 332. 
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fore impure in heart, hypocritical in profession, dishonest in practice, 
brutal in spirit, merciless in purpose. .... (1856) 88 
Modern ecclesiastical temporizing in the areas of peace and civil 
rights has evoked similar condemnations from time to time. 
The willingness of the church thus to play the lobbyist or the 
politician rather than the prophet seems to me to be part and 
parcel of the Erastian tradition as I have been describing it - the 
view that the church is one of the many institutional forms through 
which a Christian society conforms itself to the will of God. The 
will of God may be in some cases unchanging and unambiguous, 
but if it is to be approximated in a concrete situation, means 
capable of affecting the concrete situation must be used. As long 
as the church is considered part of the institutional structure of 
society, it cannot be faulted either for departing from the realm of 
generalities or for limiting itself to practical measures. 
In fact, the two-pronged critique of the church's stance on social 
problems rests on presuppositions that seem to me High Church. 
Whether we propose an even-handed proclamation of ultimate 
moral and religious values or an even-handed denunciation of the 
concrete situation, we are conceiving of the church as standing 
over against society in general, the guardian of a revelation to 
which society in general cannot be expected to conform. 
IV 
HIGH CHURCH FORMS 
The High Church view as I have been describing it provides the 
state with a limit and the church with a critique. What it fails to 
do is provide the whole church-state nexus with an institutional 
High Church witness. This, in my opinion, has been a serious 
defect in our national life. I have no wish to discount the value of 
our Erastian tradition in giving practical content to a number of 
Christian values. But the lack of High Church institutions to set 
that tradition off has impoverished us in a number of ways. 
Especially has it contributed to our tendency to an imbecile com- 
SId., 19o. 
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placency when things go well, and an equally imbecile despair 
when things go wrong. 
This necessity for a High Church element in the Christian ex- 
perience of society derives, I suppose, from a deeper necessity in- 
herent in Christianity itself. Much of a Christian's life in the 
world must be worked out in terms of a dialectic between eternity 
and time, between the Godhead and the manhood of Jesus Christ. 
It is this dialectic that is reflected in the institutions of society 
when those institutions present a vital dialectic between High 
Church and Erastian forms. Only in this way can the overall 
structure of society give adequate institutional expression to the 
full range of the concerns of a Christian. 
In this dialectic, I see High Church institutions 89 as playing a 
threefold part: 
i. They stand witness to the transcendent sovereignty of God.90 
They are not utilitarian. They make no claim to accomplish any- 
thing. They are simply there, vindicating God's claim to a place 
in the society that cannot be encompassed within any human 
purpose. 
2. Their response to social evils is not to call for amelioration, but to 
proclaim the judgment of God. For the institution to be relevant, 
the judgment must be related to the existential failings of the 
particular society; yet, it must point beyond those failings to the 
underlying failure of all Christians to live up to their profession, 
"9I have decided, with some reluctance, to brave the conceptual perils of charac- 
terizing an institution, qua institution, as "High Church." High Churchmanship, 
as I have defined it, is not an institutional form, but an insight into the overall 
church-state relation - that is, into the relation of institutions generally with one 
another. Historically, though, this insight has always cast up institutional forms 
peculiar to itself - not, perhaps, by any logical necessity, but by the exigencies of 
the dialectic in a given time and place. The medieval institutions of sanctuary and 
clerical immunity are examples. When I speak of "High Church institutions" here, 
I mean institutions that seem to take their raison d'etre from a High Church in- 
sight, or that seem calculated to hold up the High Church end of the dialectic. 
' How an institution can stand witness to anything is a question of some 
subtlety. I have tried to explore it a little in A Prospectus for a Symbolist Juris- 
prudence, Natural Law Forum 2 (i957), 88. I suspect, incidentally, that it is this 
symbolic aspect of High Churchmanship that supports its traditional connection 
with a "high" doctrine of the sacraments and the liturgy. This connection is, I 
think, one of congruity rather than of logical necessity. It is noteworthy that 
English Presbyterians tended to take a High Church stand in the seventeenth cen- 
tury, and that a number of nineteenth-century High Churchmen based their litur- 
gical practices on their interpretation of the rubrics established by ecclesiastical au- 
thority rather than on their sacramental theology. 
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and of all society to be the Kingdom of God. John Jay Chapman's 
remarks on a racial lynching (it is hard to believe that they were 
written in 191II) may indicate what I have in mind: 
The trouble has come down to us out of the past. The only 
reason that slavery is wrong is that it is cruel and makes men 
cruel and leaves them cruel. Someone may say that you and I 
cannot repent because we did not do the act. But we are in- 
volved in it. We are still looking on. Do you not see that this 
whole event is merely the last parable, the most vivid, the most 
terrible illustration that ever was given by man or imagined by 
a Jewish prophet, of the relation between good and evil in this 
world, and of the relation of men to one another? 
This whole matter has been an historic episode; but it is a 
part, not only of our national history, but of the personal history 
of each one of us. With the great disease (slavery) came the 
climax (the war), and after the climax gradually began the 
cure, and in the process of cure comes now the knowledge of 
what the evil was. I say that our need is new life, and that books 
and resolutions will not save us, but only such disposition in our 
hearts and souls as will enable the new life, love, force, hope, 
virtue, which surround us always, to enter into us. 
This is the discovery that each man must make for himself - 
the discovery that what he really stands in need of he cannot 
get for himself, but must wait till God gives it to him. I have 
felt the impulse to come here to-day to testify to this truth."9 
A judgment so formulated might bring about a massive prise de 
conscience in the overall society and so work an amelioration of the 
conditions to which the judgment was addressed. But the task of 
the High Church institutions is still the judgment itself. 
3. They offer a refuge, I hope not from involvement in the world, 
but from a kind of servitude to the world and its concerns. With- 
in the framework of a suitable High Church structure, the Chris- 
tian can assert his own freedom vis-a-vis society, and, in the light 
of that freedom, formulate his work and witness in the world. 
Historically, the development of High Church institutions along 
these lines has been in the context of an absolute papacy, a divine 
" The Selected Writings of John Jay Chapman, Barzun ed. (Garden City, 
Doubleday, 1959), 288. 
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right monarchy, or at the very least a traditional national church. 
In our own society, as I have endeavored to show, the conceptions 
of the Voluntary Principle, and of limited government, have left 
a place for High Church institutions to develop, but the institu- 
tions have not developed to fill the place. The question is whether 
we may expect them to do so in the future, as they have not done 
in the past. 
A book has just come out that may point the way to an answer. 
It is a collection of essays, called The Underground Church, 
edited by Malcolm Boyd.92 The authors are all involved with 
Christian movements that operate outside the ecclesiastical struc- 
tures with which we are familiar - hence the term "underground." 
The relations between these movements and the traditional struc- 
tures, which the authors call somewhat contemptuously the "in- 
stitutional church," vary. Some are permissible - if unusual - 
by traditional standards. Some are exuberantly uncanonical, 
heterodox, or both. Some are even excommunicated. In any event, 
they take their own structures (they are less unstructured than 
most of them suppose) more seriously than those of the tradi- 
tional denominations to which they belong. 
The typical structure is described by one of the authors as fol- 
lows: 
What I have seen as the characteristic form of the Underground 
Church is the gathering together of Catholics, Anglicans, Protestants, 
and followers of Jesus (baptized or unbaptized) in a common meal - 
because it is the only way they have been able to find the strength of 
community for the job that faced them tomorrow. Sometimes that 
common meal has taken the form of a traditional liturgy, or an ex- 
perimental iturgy, or a completely free liturgy, or a sharing of bread 
and wine, or of coffee and doughnuts; I am not able to make any 
sharp distinctions among these even if I wished to. When it has been 
a liturgy, more or less, there has never been any question about the 
validity of any minister present; it is taken for granted that if he is 
authorized in his own denomination and chooses to be present, he is 
the representative of Christ. As a matter of course, all the ministers 
present concelebrate, although this is irregular for the Anglicans and 
illegal in Canon Law for the Romans. 
92 New York, Sheed & Ward, 1968 (hereafter U.C.). 
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We have had these common meals in parish houses, in private homes 
in the suburbs, in the ghetto, in houses of hospitality, in jail, outside 
San Quentin during an execution, on the Capital steps at Sacramento 
while capital punishment was being debated, on the vigil line at Port 
Chicago while the napalm trucks rolled by. Others can tell where 
they have gathered together. Above all, there has been no question 
of the meaning of what was done - the argument over which so many 
barrels of ink have been spilled during the Reformation, the Counter- 
reformation, the Ecumenical movement, the Councils. Because the 
meaning was defined in every man's heart to his own satisfaction by 
the common purpose, the job in hand.93 
The tendency, then, is to let the congregation define the Euch- 
arist,9" whereas I suppose a traditional churchman would have it 
that the Eucharist defines the congregation: 
The visible church of Christ is a congregation of faithful men, in 
which the pure Word of God is preached, and the Sacraments be duly 
ministered according to Christ's ordinance in all things that of neces- 
sity are requisite to the same.95 
But the real quarrel of the authors with the institutional church is 
not over Eucharistic theology. They object to the institutional 
church because it is, as Malcolm Boyd puts it, "the chaplain of 
the status quo" " - i.e., is Erastian. 
The Church, in losing ground as an institution which regulates be- 
havior, now has little function outside of its place as an institution 
among other institutions in the jumble of modern man's social col- 
lectivities.97 
They are vitally concerned with those areas - notably, race, war, 
poverty - in which the witness of the institutional church has 
9 BROWN, Toward a United Peace and Freedom Church, U.C. 31, 41-42. See 
also ZIMMER, The People of the Underground Church, U.C. 7, 7-8. 
9' GROSSMAN, The Invisible Christian, U.C. 207, 216: "The liturgy is not meant 
to form the community, but, rather, to be an expression of that community." 
9~This is Art. XIX of the Anglican Thirty-Nine Articles. Art. VII of the 
Lutheran Augsburg Confession is to the same effect. Standard Roman Catholic 
doctrine would have to be stated a little differently to allow for the claims of the 
hierarchy, but the idea that the liturgy forms the community, not the community 
the liturgy, seems to underlie the insistence of the Second Vatican Council that 
liturgical innovation is a prerogative of the highest authorities in the church. 
BOYD, Ecclesia Christi, U.C. I, 4. 
9 GROSSMAN, supra, note 94, at 209. 
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not measured up to the fulness of the Gospel. They are relatively 
indifferent to areas - notably, sex - in which the witness of the 
institutional church has been less deficient: 
"The Church" will be seen less and less as a building, on a corner, to 
be visited to confess masturbation and adultery and to indulge in a 
period of "magic." 98 
This allocation of relative values - with which one could be a 
Christian and yet disagree - has a good deal to do with the 
urgency of their protest. 
But we are still not at the roots of the quarrel. No serious 
Christian can suppose that race, poverty, and war are unimportant. 
These matters deserve his attention and the attention of his 
church. In fact, they are getting such attention. The problem is 
that the attention they are getting is in terms of the traditional 
Erastian response to social evils, as I have outlined that response 
above. The underground churchmen pass on this response the 
same condemnation Garrison passed on it a century ago: 
The Church is struggling, sacrificing even its own integrity, to sustain 
its organic life recognized in terms of buildings, stained glass, real 
estate, and homiletical whoredom.99 
There are those Christians who agree that racism is a moral evil but 
advocate prudence in removing it from society. They fear losing 
people as Church members; they fear losing money. If preaching the 
message of justice and brotherhood and the condemnation of racism 
means that half of our congregations are going to stop coming to 
church on Sunday, we will lose millions of dollars. But perhaps the 
Church has to die, perhaps it has to be crucified, in order to experience 
resurrection.100 
Here, then, in the burgeoning cell groups described by these 
98BOYD, Imitatio Christi, U.C. 238, 245. Cf. GROPPI, The Church and Civil 
Rights, U.C. 70, 75: "I do not believe that morality is synonymous with a negative 
attitude toward sex and abstinence from what we call bad language." Cf. BROWN, 
supra, note 93, at 43-44: 
The one thing which is lacking so far is a definition of family life as a Christian. 
To a large extent this is a reflection of the stresses of the Peace movement, which 
favor the unmarried, those with casual liaisons, Catholic celibates, the divorced, 
little old ladies in tennis shoes. Lest this be thought a criticism, it is simply in- 
tended as a translation of St. Paul's recommendations to the Church at Corinth. 
" ZIMMER, supra, note 93, at 14. 
" 
GROPPI, supra, note 98, at 74. 
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essays, is a vital institutional Christian witness, and one which 
stands clearly over against society. It condemns alike the "status 
quo" orientation of secular society and the Erastian palliatives of 
the institutional church. These groups are also a clear embodi- 
ment of the Voluntary Principle. The accounts of their grass- 
roots development are curiously reminiscent of Baird's account of 
the building of churches in frontier communities.'01 
I think these groups are coming also to a High Church stance 
on the social evils with which they are concerned. While they 
speak in terms of reform and amelioration, their real significance is 
in their proclamation of the judgment of God. For the problems 
they face, they have no better solutions to offer than anyone else 
does. But their unblinking exposition of the problems makes the 
proposed solutions seem futile, and their moral fervor makes the 
proposed solutions seem trivial. 
One of the contributors to the volume, for instance, is Father 
James Groppi, the Savonarola of Milwaukee, who spent the better 
part of a year in a bitter and sometimes bloody battle to put an 
open housing ordinance through his city council. 
During the early days of our open-housing demonstrations they were 
literally almost killed. We have all been in jail; we have all eaten 
tear gas.102 
But anyone who is familiar with the operation of open-housing 
legislation in other communities will find it difficult to believe that 
that is what all the excitement was about."1" It is good to have 
such legislation on the books, but it will hardly avail to appease the 
101 BAIRD, supra, note i, at 298-99. 
102 Supra, note 98, at 74. 
103 My own community, for instance, has just enacted an open-housing ordinance. 
The first serious attempt to put such an ordinance through was mounted in 1963. 
Those who prepared the 1963 ordinance assembled a considerable amount of data 
on the need for it. The main thrust of the data was that middle-class Negroes were 
finding it outrageously difficult to get middle-class housing. By 1968, this situation 
was considerably ameliorated, though by no means done away with. On the whole, 
in 1968, a middle-class Negro could put a suitable roof over his head, though not 
always the roof he wanted. The ordinance may do something to widen the range 
of available choices for him. If it had been enacted in 1963, it might have also had 
some value as an earnest of good will on the part of the white majority. In 1968, 
it seems too little and too late to serve that purpose. As for increasing the range of 
housing choices available to Negroes who have not yet made the middle class, the 
problem in 1968 is just what it was in 1963 - they cannot get better housing be- 
cause they have not the wherewithal to pay for it. 
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divine anger of a man like Groppi; still less to dissipate the con- 
ditions that called that anger forth. The Underground Church is 
not calling on us to erase a transitory blemish from our national 
life, but rather to live that life in a new and enduring (and, please 
God, redemptive) awareness of the divine judgment.104 
Meanwhile, the Underground Church institutions have de- 
veloped strongly the element of refuge that I see as another High 
Church function. Here is Father Groppi, immediately after the 
passage quoted above: 
As the demonstrations progressed, as we were marching and singing 
together, we were growing in our relationship as brothers. White 
people and Black people were growing. In true intergroup relations, 
a person never ceases to grow. And the more we grow in brotherhood, 
the more we grow in the Spirit, for brotherhood and life in the Spirit, 
like the spiritual and temporal orders, are inseparable.105 
That is, the Milwaukee Youth Council is for Father Groppi a 
refuge from the prevailing racism of the overall society, just as 
the monastery was for the medieval man a refuge from the pre- 
vailing petty warfare and violent sexuality of the overall society. 
This theme is picked up by the Underground Churchmen again 
and again: 
More than anyplace else, I too now find the Church of the Christ I 
have long loved in the "small groups of intimate friends getting to- 
gether. . o ." It is here I find not only expression of, but care for, 
the most powerful ideas and ideals that I have known. .... Bearing 
the humiliation with the few as the majority rationalizes its way 
toward more inaction: these are the truths of real life in Christ 
today. 
...o10o 
The "good news" about the freedom of the sons of God becomes per- 
ceptible and significant when its liberating message is specified as . 
the possibility of escape from the cycle of violence enthralling teen- 
agers.0o7 
"' BROWN, supra, note 93, at 46, seems to be working toward an understanding of 
this: "But if we try and enter down into the secret places of our psychology or 
think about our knowledge of history, we truly know that the pressures that brought 
us together are permanent ones." 
105 GROPPI, supra, note 98, at 74. 
'" ZIMMER, supra, note 93, at 26. 
1o GRODEN and CLASBY, Church as Counter-sign: Process and Promise, U.C. 102, 
113-14. 
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The most obvious and immediate asset one experiences in an Under- 
ground Church is a true sense of belonging. Unlike the average parish 
in which neither the priest nor the other parishioners are likely to 
know one another's name, in an Underground Church all the members 
soon know one another on a first-name basis, and, what is more im- 
portant, are willing to share their thoughts and souls with one an- 
other.108 
We are trying to walk in the freedom of Abraham's faith, out of the 
oppression of our closed and too clubby little world and into open 
air and open history, into the middle of ultimate realities.1'9 
War, alienation, anonymity, gang fights: the evils are variously 
specified, but the sense of belonging to a small group free of the 
evil in question is there each time. It is one of the most powerful 
elements in the witness of the Underground Church. 
Proclaiming God's judgment, then, on our social evils, and 
offering a point of refuge and freedom from them, the institutional 
forms of the Underground Church are authentically High Church. 
But they fall short of institutionalizing the fulness of the High 
Church witness, because they fail to stand for the transcendent 
sovereignty of God. It is not simply that they neglect to offer this 
witness; they counter it actively at two focal points. First, by 
claiming for the here-and-now congregation and worshipper full 
control over the significance of the Eucharist, they negate the 
transcendence of God in space and time. Second, by discounting 
traditional sexual values, they negate the transcendence of God in 
the life of the individual. 
The relation of traditional Eucharistic doctrine and traditional 
sexual purity to the divine transcendence lies in the very fact that 
they are not of obvious relevance to the immediate situation. To 
accept them is to accept that God has something to offer to the 
church as a historical presence,1"0 and to me as a human being 
"' 
beyond the needs I experience here and now. Living by them is 
1os HAFNER, Up from the Underground, U.C. 120, 131. 
109 KIRK, Emmaus: A Venture in Community and Communication, U.C. 138, 151. 
11o It is significant in this regard that BROWN, the one professional theologian 
among the authors in U.C., 
seems to regard the church as gathered not by the word 
of God but by the exigencies of the historical situation. See the passage quoted 
supra, note 104. 
... On this, see the critique of situation ethics in BURTCHAELL, The Conservatism 
of Situation Ethics, New Blackfriars 48 (1966), 7. 
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essentially living by faith; it yields only gradually an insight into 
what they are for."2 
"My thoughts are not your thoughts nor your ways my ways, 
says the Lord." My fear is that these Underground Church insti- 
tutions, by cutting themselves off from the channels of transcen- 
dence, will deprive themselves of any insights beyond those they 
now possess. If so, they will fall with the passage of time, as other 
High Church institutions have done, from proclaiming the judg- 
ment of God into mounting a captious and irrelevant critique, 
from offering a position of freedom and refuge into offering an 
enclave of human comfort. If, on the other hand, they could in 
some way relate the divine transcendence to the forms in which 
they now operate, they might provide our society with an enduring 
High Church witness to set off against our Erastian tradition, and 
structure a truly Christian society. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Let me now gather these threads together, if I can, and try to 
outline the institutions of the American church-state nexus as it 
just might come to be. 
First, there would be a variety of institutions conceived, as they 
have always been, in Erastian terms. These, some governmental, 
some ecclesiastical, some private and secular, would operate 
schools, hospitals, cooperatives, credit unions, recreational ac- 
tivities, and other forms of practical social service that commend 
themselves to Christians. Their support would come partly from 
specific contributions, partly from United Funds, foundations and 
the like, and partly from tax money, in accordance with the need 
and importance of each particular institution. 
The participation of churches and of individual Christians in 
these institutions would be directed by a continuing High Church 
critique of the whole society. Christians would respond to the di- 
vine judgment embodied in that critique by applying their wis- 
112 This idea of faith as an open-ended acceptance of enlightenment is well 
brought out in JOHN S. DUNNE, A Search for God in Time and Memory (New 
York, Macmillan, 1969). 
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dom and resources to the real needs of their society - not in the 
expectation of justifying themselves or the society, but in the 
humble expectation of redemption through Jesus Christ. 
This kind of humble expectation would involve a Christian 
patience under the condemnations of the proponents of the High 
Church critique. Demonstrations, which seem to serve contem- 
porary High Churchmen rather as excommunication served Inno- 
cent III, are neither practical proposals nor arguments. If a situ- 
ation is complex, they will not make it less so; they will simply 
serve to make explicit the judgment of God. Those who are con- 
cerned with finding and implementing practical measures will have 
to take them seriously, but not panic under them. 
Meanwhile, the High Church institutions would temper their 
strictures by a heightened awareness of the enduring realities of 
the human condition and the theology of redemption. Not that 
they would compromise their witness against the evils of society, 
but that they would maintain a certain respect even for those they 
condemned, remembering that in the last analysis the judgment 
they proclaim is not upon certain bad people, but upon all man- 
kind, including themselves. 
The form and development of these High Church institutions 
would be rather like that of the Underground Church movements 
I have been describing. Most of them would be spontaneous 
responses to particular social situations, and would come and go 
with the social conditions that called them forth. They would 
continue to offer a witness against and a liberation from the racist 
patterns that infect our society, the cycle of poverty in which so 
many of our people are involved, warfare and other forms of 
violence, and the dehumanizing effect of an overly efficient mass 
polity. 
They would also offer a witness against and a liberation from 
the mechanistic and unlovely sexuality that permeates so much of 
our popular culture, and seems as dehumanizing and as displeas- 
ing to God as any of our other social evils. Perhaps they would 
come to this witness and liberation through a reconciliation with 
some of the more traditional church institutions - youth groups, 
Cana Conferences, and the like - that have long carried the bur- 
den of Christian witness with respect to sex. In any event, they 
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would be free of the identification of sexual purity with white 
middle-class respectability that currently distorts every aspect of 
Christian witness in our society. 
These grass-roots institutions would abandon their claim to 
define the meaning of the Eucharist for themselves. They would 
recognize that as they do not possess the fulness of the divine 
revelation, the meaning of the Eucharist cannot be circumscribed 
by their understanding of it. At the same time, the main-stream 
churches would accept the adoption by these groups of liturgical 
forms suited to their own needs, but consistent with traditional 
views of Eucharistic theology. This acceptance would be fur- 
thered by the realization on everyone's part that participation in 
groups of this kind is a special vocation rather than the wave of 
the future for every Christian. The reconciliation of the mendi- 
cant orders with ecclesiastical authority in the Middle Ages might 
be a pattern for reconciliations of this kind today. 
In this context, central authorities in the church would accept 
the Voluntary Principle, just as do central authorities in the state. 
They would expect people to set up groups for particular religious 
purposes, just as they do for particular secular purposes. They 
would supervise these groups, but not expect them to obtain ad- 
vance approval.1'" 
The primary function, then, of the institutional church would 
be to stand witness to what is timeless and universal in the Gospel 
and the sacraments, especially the Eucharist. Like the state, it 
would overarch both High Church and Erastian forms, support- 
ing a variety of work and witness, according to the exigencies of 
time and place. It would claim for itself in unequivocal terms 
the position of transcendence left open by the self-imposed limits 
on the power of the state, the position of universality left open by 
particular High Church forms, the position of necessity left open 
by contingent Erastian forms. 
I seem to be speaking here as a Roman Catholic, and perhaps 
in the end a High Churchman after all. I am aware that the 
13" For instance in my own church, some modification of Codex Juris Canonici 
Canons 684-99 would seem in order, e.g., can. 686, ? I: "No association will be 
recognized in the Church that has not been set up or at least approved by legitimate 
ecclesiastical authority." 
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Voluntary Principle is Protestant in origin, and that Protestants 
have lived with it more easily than Catholics. I am aware also that 
not every denomination of Christians is prepared, as my own is, to 
make the transcendent claims I have just envisaged. Some de- 
nominations would no doubt be content to see themselves as mani- 
festations of the Voluntary Principle ("gathered" churches), and 
leave the claims to transcendence to Christ Himself. Certainly 
each denomination would have to consult its ecclesiological doc- 
trine to see what claims of this kind it could make for itself, and 
its ecumenical doctrine to see what such claims it could recognize 
for others. 
The upshot is that the American church-state nexus I envisage 
would not be free from denominational divergences. The facile 
ecumenism of the Underground Church is part and parcel of its 
failure to bear a sufficient witness to the transcendence of God. 
True ecumenism requires every denomination to bear an un- 
compromising witness before the others to its own experience of 
the inexhaustible reality of Jesus Christ. Perhaps the witness to 
institutional transcendence as I have described it will be a contri- 
bution of my own denomination to the synthesis that God may one 
day bring about. 
Be that as it may, the church-state nexus I have envisaged is 
not one free from conflict, or one with all the problems worked out. 
It has built-in potentialities for tension, frustration, or even heart- 
break, as any human situation has."' It might be a situation, 
though, in which the Word of God could break forth in its own 
way, or at least a situation in which a Christian could live by his 
own best understanding of the Gospel, and do such work and bear 
such witness as God has called him to. This is perhaps all we can 
hope for from institutional patterns in this world. As Chapman 
says: 
This is the discovery that each man must make for himself - the 
discovery that what he really stands in need of he cannot get for 
himself, but must wait till God gives it to him. I have felt the im- 
pulse to come here today to testify to this truth. 
"1I like Father GROPPI'S notion of "creative tension," supra, note 98, at 83. 
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